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Abstract. "Trustworthy data" is the fuel for ensuring transparent trace-
ability, precise decision-making, and cogent coordination in the supply
chain (SC) space. However, the disparate data silos act as a trade bar-
rier in orchestrating the provenance of product story starting from the
transformation of raw materials into the circuit board to the assembling
of electronic components into end products available on the store shelf
for customers. Therefore, to bridge the fragmented siloed information
across global supply chain partners, the diffusion of blockchain (BC) as
one of the advanced distributed ledger technology (DLT) takeover the
on-premise legacy systems. Nevertheless, the challenging constraints of
blockchain including scalability, accessing off-line data, fee-less micro-
transactions and many more lead to the third wave of blockchain called
IOTA. In this paper, we propose a framework for supporting provenance
in the electronic supply chain (ECS) by using permissioned IOTA ledger.
Realizing the crucial requirement of trustworthy data, we useMasked Au-
thenticated Messaging (MAM) channel provided by IOTA that allows the
SC players to procure distributed information while keeping confidential
trade flows, tamper-proof data, and fine-grained accessibility rights. To
identify operational disruption, we devise a transparent product ledger
through transaction data and consignment information to keep track of
the complete product journey at each intermediary step during SC pro-
cesses. Furthermore, we evaluate the secure provenance data construction
time for varying payload size.
Keywords: Blockchain·Distributed Ledger Technology· Electronic Sup-
ply Chain· Internet of Things· IOTA· Masked Authenticated Messaging·
Provenance· Trustworthy data.
1 Introduction
Electronic Supply Chain (ESC) revolves around an intricate and intensive pro-
cess during which raw materials or natural resources are transformed into circuit
boards and electronic components, integrated and assembled into end products,
and ultimately available on the shelf stores for customers. During the product
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evolution journey, the data diffusion as Provenance Data across multiple SC par-
ticipating entities can enable the enterprises to choreograph their demand-supply
circle, figure out win-win circumstances, perform risk assessment, maximize rev-
enues and forecast their future goals. Reliance on provenance is considered to be
an effective mechanism as it tracks the complete lineage of data during acquisi-
tion, processing, transmission, and reception phases. Thus, provenance ensures
the integrity of data during data debugging, reconciliation, replication, deci-
sion making, performance tuning, auditing, and forensic analysis [1–4]. How-
ever, procuring product provenance data is a baffling and exhaustive task due
to disparate data silos, complexity of data aggregation, and on-premise opera-
tional practices and procedures. Furthermore, relying on collated data gathered
from a sheer variety of distinct sources to infer reliable information and execute
critical decision-making processes demands the originator of data as well as the
intermediate actors playing with data to be trustworthy and transparent.
Due to the unavailability of a platform which can provide traceability solu-
tions to access the data oceans holding complete information about the prod-
uct life cycle, the consumers are helpless to differentiate between reliable and
counterfeit products. The proliferation of counterfeit products is deteriorating
consumer trust and also causing reputational damage to the company’s name
across the globe. For instance, defense system manufacturers face difficulty in
detecting counterfeit items, as counterfeiters attempt to imitate materials, part
numbers, and serial numbers to simulate authentic parts [5]. One such event
occurred in 2006 when the Japanese electronics company "NEC" took two years
to uncover an elaborate chain that was, in effect, faking the company’s entire
product lines1. Similarly, integrated circuits (IC) counterfeiting has turned up
in many industrial sectors including computer, telecommunications, and auto-
motive electronics [6]. The legitimate electronics companies miss out on about
$100 billion of global revenue every year due to counterfeiting [7]. To mitigate
risk effectively across the SC, either atomistic sources of risk is required that
involves scrutinizing a restricted part of the SC and is suitable for low-value and
less complex components or holistic sources of risk are required that involves
a comprehensive analysis of the SC and is preferable for high-value and com-
plex components [8]. In either of the cases, contingency planning is required to
identify the root cause of operational disruption and to identify the fraudulent
middleman.
With the arrival of distributed ledger technology (DLT), visionary growers,
processors, wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and others become capable of en-
hancing visibility and accountability throughout the SC to support transparency,
collaboration, longevity, and security. Furthermore, it brings the SC to the shop-
per enabling customers to dive deep beyond the label and use their purchasing
power to drive real change. In this regard, the core idea of blockchain-based
architecture as DLT has been used in many application areas including agricul-
ture or food products [9–12], aviation industry, [13], and many other uses cases
discussed in [14] to solve the issues associated with legacy systems. However, it
1April 2006, Next step in pirating: Faking a company
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is still facing challenges such as scalability, off-line capability, and transaction
fee. To address these limitations, IOTA [15] brings a digital transformation in
the third generation DLT technology.
In this paper, we have focused on formulating an IOTA-based framework for
supporting provenance in the ESC. By integrating MAM protocol on the top of
IOTA (as shown in 1), the proposed framework provides transparent traceability
of data throughout the SC ensuring trustworthy and quality data.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
– We investigate the significance of integrating provenance in the ESC. We
also address the research gaps and highlight the key factors for adopting
IOTA in the SC in comparison to the BC.
– For product traceability, we propose an IOTA-based provenance framework
that encloses the diverse product story as provenance data at each interme-
diary process in the ESC, thereby solving the fragmented and asymmetric
information issues.
– We exploit MAM channel to ensure confidential trade flow among competi-
tors. Moreover, it preserves data integrity, and fine-grained data access to
the trusted SC players only.
– Finally, we present a systematic evolution of supply chain system i.e., from
legacy systems to DLT in the SC space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
IOTA and SC. Section 3 discusses the significance for the integration of IOTA
to support provenance in SC. Section 4 introduces the system model. Section
5 describes the proposed IOTA framework for the ESC. Section 6 presents the
simulation results. Section 7 discusses the security analysis of our approach.
Section 8 surveys related work, and finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
IOTA
Transport Layer
Masked Authenticated Messaging
Supply Chain Space
Application Layer 
Service Layer
Fig. 1: Overview of the IoT stack.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a quick overview of the key terms in IOTA and SC.
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Fig. 2: Tangle graph showing transactions/sites and edge set connecting sites.
2.1 IOTA
IOTA is a public, permissionless, and a distributed ledger that leverages directed
acyclic graph (DAG) data structure termed as Tangle for storing interlinked but
individual transactions exchanged among peers [15]. Fig. 2 shows a Tangle graph
where each square-block represents a transaction/site which is propagated by a
node. Every new transaction attached to the Tangle graph forms an edge set.
In order to create a transaction, a node (i) creates and signs a transaction with
its private key, (ii) use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm
[16] to choose and validate two other non-conflicting unconfirmed transactions
(tips), and (iii) solve a cryptographic puzzle (knows as hashcash [17]) to perform
Proof of Work (PoW) for preventing Sybil attack. A transaction status can be
categorized as confirmed transactions (green nodes), uncertain transactions (red
nodes) and unconfirmed transactions or tips (grey nodes) as shown in Fig. 2.
The revolutionary features of IOTA including scalability, decentralization,
zero transaction fee, speedy microtransactions, off-line capability, and quantum
security enables it to gain ground not only in Machine to Machine (M2M) econ-
omy but also in application areas encompassing Internet of Things (IoT).
2.2 Supply Chain System
Supply chain management system encompasses coordination and collaboration
among channel partners (suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers,
and customers) for planning and managing of upstream and downstream process-
based activities such as the transformation of natural resources/raw materials,
sourcing, procurement, production, conversion, and logistics [18]. Fig. 3 shows
the primary players participating in a sand to hand story of mobile phones in
the ESC.
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Fig. 3: Electronics Supply Chain showing the supply chain players involved in the sand
to hand story of mobile phones.
3 Motivation: Integrating Provenance Support in the
Electronics Supply Chain Through IOTA
Supply chains empower participants for collaborative commerce in a global
value chain. A product (for instance, mobile phone) journey from sand to hand,
comprise of numerous chained phases during which components are produced,
sourced, refined, integrated, and assembled by multiple entities ubiquitously.
Nevertheless, numerous friction points thwart supply chains from accomplish-
ing their maximum potential, for instance, intricate and opaque mechanics of
global commerce, complexity (upstream and downstream), manual antiquated
processes, cumbersome paperwork, and divergent standards. Furthermore, sup-
ply chains are held back by imperfect and asymmetric information as huge vol-
umes of veracious data are inaccessible to the SC players during cross-border
trading resulting in communication gaps, increased costs, diluted or forfeited
data, erroneous data aggregation, scattered information, market failures, or ab-
sence of markets at all. Therefore, it can be concluded that a sound corporate
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ecosystem and a sustainable SC stipulates two pivotal features to be incorpo-
rated: (i) Product story (ii) Orchestrating episodes of product story.
3.1 Provenance: Product Story
In order to ensure transparent logistical planning and to preserve the integrity
of the SC, provenance plays a significant role in providing a trustworthy, authen-
ticated and accurate data lineage to unlock the product chronicle at deep-tier
level. The provenance data enables the participating buyers and sellers to trace
the product from its inventory procurement process to its point of sale stage
and hence provides an efficient and feasible way for tackling counterfeits or false
claims from untrustworthy parties.
3.2 IOTA: Orchestrating Episodes of Product Story
Relying solely on provenance to notch trustworthy data would be a mission "Im-
possible", therefore, in order to efficiently and proactively systematize the prod-
uct story in terms of provenance data, we collocate the product story episodes
in a tamper-proof product ledger perpetuated by IOTA. IOTA is a promising
technology that could play an indispensable role in providing salient features de-
sirable for a supply chain including decentralized, distributed and inter-operable
data stream to consortium members. Furthermore, it provides data auditability
to identify accountable actors causing data contamination, reasonable confiden-
tiality and privacy of the trade flows, facilitating access control on immutable
and trustworthy data. In essence, coalescing real-time provenance data through
resource-constrained sensors (such as track and trace of precise location informa-
tion, transfer of custody, monitoring environmental conditions or temperature
fluctuations during storing and shipping product through GPS, RFID tags, tem-
perature sensors, humidity sensors etc.) that can drive decision-making power
during risk mitigation forecasting.
3.3 Why Say "NO" to Blockchain and "YES" to IOTA in the
Supply Chain Space?
IOTA flared a paradigm shift in the third wave of blockchain by providing a
solution to the challenging constraints encountered by the BC. In essence, the
IOTA platform exhibits the following salient features essential to SC in contrast
to BC.
1. Scalability: In the supply chain space, transaction load is expected to in-
crease based on the actors and activities in the network over time. Traditional
blockchain runs into scaling snag as the transactions and the validation of
said transactions are siloed and often at odds with each other. A permis-
sioned blockchain has the potential to scale to a few hundred nodes [19],
which may affect the latency and throughput of the network. To address
the problem of scalability, [19–21] used the concept of sharding single BC
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ledger i.e., processing of transactions is distributed across multiple nodes in
parallel. However, IOTA scales horizontally and thus resolves the problem
of scalability without any need to take care of global and local ledgers.
2. IOTA for IoT: Cost effective miniaturized things or objects with com-
putational and networking capabilities are providing promising solutions to
optimize the tracking events in the supply cycle. However, IoT-linked secu-
rity crisis may breach the system security making it vulnerable to attacks,
for instance, on October, 2016 a US-based DNS provider, "Dyn" experienced
a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) through Mirai malware that
utilizes weak or default passwords web cameras and digital video recorders,
manufactured by China-based Hangzhou Xiongmai Technologies [22]. Under
such catastrophic circumstances, it is difficult to determine the devices’ own-
ers. To cope with such situations, IOTA provides a high end-to-end security
level called Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM) protocol that facili-
tates encrypted data communication and securely anchors it to the Tangle
in a quantum proof fashion. Moreover, through the MAM channel, access
privileges can be tailored, thereby making it a perfect platform to build
tomorrow’s trade facilitation systems in supply chain space.
3. Off-line Transaction: IOTA supports off-line capability for handling sce-
narios such as information retrieval from remote areas and sensors on a
container of a freighter ship that losses connectivity during ocean trans-
portation. This mechanism is called "partitioning" during which a Tangle
in IOTA can get branch off by creating an off-line cluster and back into the
network upon Internet connectivity thereby, securing the local transactions.
4. Speedy and Zero Fee Transactions without Miners: Based on the
concept "users equal to validators", IOTA is free from miners and hence
does not charge any transaction fee. Furthermore, by enabling transactions
to be validated in parallel, IOTA has the highest transactions per second
among other distributed ledger.
5. Machines with Wallets: IOTA has powered the resource-constrained de-
vices to participate in the machine to machine (M2M) world. Being a pow-
erful catalyst in M2M economy, it allows machines to interact seamlessly
and instantly transact with each other through its bi-directional off-Tangle
payment channel called "Flash Channel" allowing massive volumes of nano
and microtransactions [23]. One such electric autonomous vehicle example
scenario is suggested in [24]. Thus, IOTA can enable the automotive to pay
autonomously for services including parking, charging batteries, tolls taxes,
usage-based insurances and many more2 (as shown in Fig. 4). On September
2018, the Netherlands successfully completes testing for electric car charging
station using IOTA3. Another practical application of a digital twin with
2https://www.iota.org/verticals/mobility-automotive
3https://unhashed.com/cryptocurrency-news/netherlands-testing-electric-car-
charging-station-iota/
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IOTA is CarPass4 for vehicles telematics data (e.g. mileage, trips, environ-
mental, maintenance data)5.
Fig. 4: Info-graphics: Machines with wallets.
6. Quantum Immune: IOTA uses theWinternitz One-Time Signature Scheme [25]
which is a quantum-resistant algorithm. Nonetheless, there is an ongoing de-
bate on the ability of blockchain to survive against quantum computers6,7.
4 System Model
In this section, we describe the network model and the data model that we con-
sider for our proposed IOTA-based provenance scheme for SC. We also present
the provenance model along with the outline of elemental provenance data com-
ponents that are utilized in our proposed scheme. Finally, we discuss the security
goals that our proposed scheme aims to achieve.
4.1 Network Model
The network model consists of participating and non-participating players of the
SC as follows:
4https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/digital-carpass-from-iota-and-volkswagen-to-
track-car-performance-launches-in-2019/
5https://medium.com/@cstoecker/implementing-first-industry-4-0-use-cases-with-
iota-dag-tangle-machine-tagging-for-digital-twins-baf1943c499d
6May 2018, "If-quantum-computers-threaten-blockchains-quantum-blockchains-
could-be-the-defense."
7June 2018, "Quantum Computing: Is it the end of blockchain?"
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Fig. 5: Product manufacturing and assemblage at manufacturing unit.
4.1.1 Participating players (i) Raw producers, (ii) Suppliers, (iii) Manu-
facturers, (iv) Warehouses, (v) Logistics, and (vi) Retailers.
The raw producers provide raw materials to the supplier in order to produce
chip-sets and other peripherals. Those components are fabricated and assembled
at a manufacturing unit. The finished products (for instance, mobile phones)
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are delivered to the warehouses for distribution. Finally, customers are able to
purchase them from retailers or mobile phone service providers.
4.1.2 Non-participating players Customers, (ii) Researchers.
Non-participating members including customers and researchers are not in-
volved in SC process however, they may need to fetch the production and man-
ufacturing information about the products. Hence, they are also considered as
part of our network model.
4.2 Data Model
We assume that each SC entity acts as a Data Publisher (Dp) and publishes
its data on its MAM channel identified by ChannelID. On the other hand, the
interested viewers act as a Data Receiver (Dr) and subscribe to the desired
channel (C) to gain access to the data by using an authorization key (K). The
term K is collectively used for public Kpu and private Kpr key pairs. MAM
provides a channel where data owner who publishes the data and data viewers
who subscribe, meet. The technical details of the MAM channel are discussed in
Section 5.1.
In the context of SC, Dp and Dr can be referred to as Seller and Buyer
respectively. The data (also referred as payload) consists of (i) Transaction data
TData, and (ii) Auxiliary data AData can be represented as:
Payload← TData||AData, (1)
for instance, if a supplier is delivering material or parts to the manufacturer, then
TData consist of transaction ID (TID), supplier ID (SupplierID), and consign-
ment information (Coninfo). Coninfo may include batch ID (BID), component
ID (CID), make and model number as depicted in Fig. 5 and Fig. 9. AData con-
sists of sensor data SData (location information as 〈source, destination〉, temper-
ature, humidity), quality control information (QC), timestamp, and warranty.
TData ← TID||SellerID||Coninfo, (2a)
AData ← SData||QC||timestamp||warranty, (2b)
PData ← TData||AData. (2c)
4.3 Provenance Model
Deriving the product story involves assembling provenance data from payload’s
transaction and auxiliary data. The key factors to devise product provenance
are TID, ProductID (aka Serial#), and ChannelID. However, the additional
information can be obtained from TData and AData accordingly. To obtain the
provenance data (PData), the data from TData and AData can be fetched as
represented in eq. (2c). A Quick Response (QR) code is affixed with the shelf
display of any electronic product, containing instant information link about the
product. Upon scanning the QR code, the consumer can glean product story.
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Fig. 6: Message chain showing transaction linking among transactions and forward
secrecy enforced at and after the point of entry.
4.4 Security Goals
Our proposed scheme aims to achieve the following security properties:
1. Data Confidentiality: The data is stored on the channel in encrypted form.
Hence, only those Dr having access to the ChannelID and authorization key
(K) can obtain and decipher the payload.
2. Access Control Rights: To conceal classified trade information between
competitors, it is essential to define access control rights on the data pub-
lished on the channel. Defining access rights (i.e., grant and revoke) on data
is based on an authorization key (K) used in the restricted mode. The key
is exchanged with the legitimate SC players only and can be changed to
revoke access rights without any need to change the ChannelID. The other
modes provided by MAM channel includes public and private. Further details
related to the MAM channel are provided in Section 5.1.
3. Ownership Proof: To avoid any random user to jumble up the MAM
channel of any data publisher, signature validation is performed.
4. Forward Secrecy: To enforce forward secrecy, the subscriber can only lo-
cate and retrieve transactions at or after their point of entry in the channel,
but not before their point of entry (as shown in Fig. 6).
5. Forward Transaction Linking: Upon locating the transaction tn, the sub-
scriber can retrieve the address of the next transaction tn+1 (as shown in
Fig. 6).
6. Channel Splitting: To allow sharing only a subset of data, a MAM pub-
lisher can offshoot the channel at any desired point in time as shown in Fig.
7.
5 Framework: Procuring Provenance in SC Through
IOTA
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the characteristics and working
of MAM protocol. We also devise the proposed framework for provenance in SC
using IOTA with the help of algorithms and flow diagrams.
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Fig. 7: Channel Splitting allowing to share only a subset of data.
Table 1: Notations
Symbol Description
PData Provenance data
Dp Data publisher or Seller
Dr Data receiver or Buyer
K Authorization key
Kpu, Kpr Public key pair, Private key pair
TData, AData, PData Transaction, Auxiliary, and Provenance data
SData Sensor data
QC Quality control
5.1 Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM)
In order to ensure secure, encrypted and authenticated data stream on the Tan-
gle, Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM) module is proposed. Using the
gossip protocol, the message from Data publisher is propagated through the
network and can be access by the channel subscribers only.
5.1.1 Generating Message Chain A MAM transaction bundle consists of
two sections including (i) Signature, (ii) MAM.
Fig. 8 shows the main components of MAM Transaction Bundle.
The "MAM section" contains the masked message. In order to post a masked
message, MAM deploys Merkle tree based signature scheme that requires the cre-
ation of a root to view the payload. Furthermore, to support forward transaction
linking, MAM section also contains a connecting pointer i.e.,nextRoot and other
associated entities that are required for fetching the next payload. The approach
to access the payload depends on the channel mode used, for instance, restricted
channel mode requires authorization key pairs to encode and decode messages.
For validity check of MAM section, data publishers add a signature in the
MAM bundle and store it in the signatureMessageFragment(sMF) of the trans-
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action. Such transactions are called as "Signature section" in MAM bundle. A
comprehensive working of MAM is explained in [26].
5.1.2 Access Control and Provision of Authenticated Data To control
the data accessibility and visibility in the Tangle, MAM provides the following
channel modes: (i) public: address=root i.e., by using the address of the message,
any random user is able to decode it, (ii) private: address=hash(root) i.e., the
hash of the Merkle root is used as the address thus, preventing random users
from deciphering message as they are unable to derive the root from the hash,
and (iii) restricted : address=hash(root)+authorization key i.e., the hash of the
authorization key and the Merkle root is used as address thereby, allowing only
authorized parties to read and reconstruct the data stream. Changing the autho-
rization key results in revoking permission to access the data without requiring
the data publisher to change its ChannelID. It is important to note that consid-
ering the confidential trade flow requirements of the SC players, we prefer the
use of restricted channel mode of MAM. Furthermore, to enforce ownership of
channel, signature validation is performed upon message reception to authenti-
cate the source of the message or in other words to validate the ownership of the
publisher. Failure to signature verification results in an invalid message.
MAM Transaction Bundle 
Transaction [0]
address=
 
sMF= 
Transaction [1]
address=
 
sMF= 
Signature Section
Transaction [2]
address=
 
sMF=
MAM Section
TData TID, SellerID, Coninfo 
AData SData, QC, timestamp, warranty 
PData TData + AData
Masked Payload
Encrypted with
authorization key 
Fig. 8: MAM Transaction Bundle showing Signature section and MAM section. MAM
section consists ofMasked Payload encrypted with authorization key (restricted channel
mode). Masked Payload consists of transaction data TData and auxiliary data AData,
whereas PData can be constructed from TData and AData.
14 Sabah Suhail, Choong Seon Hong, and Abid Khan
5.2 Proposed Framework: Provenance in SC
5.2.1 Seed Generation To initiate the communication process based on ad-
dress and private key, requires a seed. A seed is more like a private key and
consists of 81 characters including upper case alphabets and digit 9. The seed
generation process uses environmental noise (for example, device drivers, net-
work packet timing etc.) as an input to a Cryptographic Secure Pseudo Random
Number Generator (CSPRNG), to produce random seed values. The process of
seed generation is discussed in eq. 3.
Seed = require(′iota− generate− seed′). (3)
5.2.2 Setting Security Level, Channel Mode, and Key Generation
IOTA has defined three security levels: 1 (low), 2 (medium), or 3 (high). The
default security level is 2, however, we use the recommended security level 3.
To keep the communication confidential, we set the channel mode as "re-
stricted" so that the authorized parties can access the data based on shared
authorization key pairs.
K is used to encrypt and decrypt the payload by a sender and receiver en-
tity respectively. The cryptographic keys can be shared among the participating
parties by using any of the existing key exchange technique, for instance, RSA
or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). However, the existing key exchange sys-
tems are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, therefore, a lattice-based
public key cryptosystem Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring (NTRU) [27]
must be adopted as it allows to generate and exchange key pairs in a quantum
secure way. In our case, we use NTRU key exchange protocol.
5.2.3 Data Publishing Each SC player creates a channel C to publish its
data on the Tangle. For further details of the payload and its sub-entities, refer
to Section 4.2. Upon selection of channel mode, security level, and authorization
key, finally, the MAM transaction bundle is attached to the Tangle. The steps
for creating a data publishing channel are shown in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Data Publishing
1: mamState ← Mam.init (iotaObject, seed, securityLevel) . Get seed from eq. 3
and set securityLevel as 3.
2: mamState ← Mam.changeMode (mamState, channelMode, Kpu) . Set
channelMode as ’restricted’ and public key pair to encrypt the payload.
3: MAMObject ← Mam.create (mamState, payload) . Create MAM Payload which
consists of transaction and auxiliary information.
4: Mam.attach (MAMObject.payload, MAMObject.address) . Attach the payload
to the Tangle.
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5.2.4 Data Receiving The interested SC players subscribe to the channel to
view the published data. The subscribers are able to receive payload based on
Root and decipher the payload based on K as presented in algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Data Receiving
1: mamState ← Mam.init (iotaObject, seed, securityLevel) . Set seed value and
securityLevel as used in algo. 1.
2: mamState ← Mam.changeMode (mamState, channelMode, Kpr) . Set
channelMode and private key pair to decrypt the payload.
3: Mam.fetch (Root, restricted, K) . Fetch message stream from Tangle.
Recalling the notion "IOTA for IoT", it is important to mention that IOTA
enables a flexible integration of the sensor data SData in the Tangle, hence,
the sensor data can be published, fetched and analyzed following the similar
approach for data publishing and data receiving. Therefore, the sensor data, for
instance, the consignment location information can be acquired accordingly.
5.2.5 Provenance Data: Fetching and Aggregating Process Collect-
ing PData consists of two steps: (i) fetching provenance (Pfetch), (ii) aggre-
gating provenance (Paggr). During the fetching process, TID, ProductID, and
ChannelID are used as the key identifiers to locate the chained information.
Once the information is fetched using key identifiers, it is maintained as Paggr
along with other granular details (including consignment information, times-
tamp, etc.). Paggr is then stored as PData. 〈SrcID〉 refers to the channel ad-
dress of the SC player who publishes the data through transaction Prev_TID.
Throughout the chain, 〈SrcID〉 helps in locating back to the intermediaries and
ultimately the originator. Hence, moving to the next channel to fetch and ag-
gregate provenance information is based on 〈SrcID〉 and Prev_TID to obtain
the respective transaction. The process of fetching and aggregating provenance
continues until the supplier is found. The steps for fetching and aggregating
provenance data from the Tangle are illustrated in algorithm 3. In order to ex-
plain the fetching and aggregating of PData, let us consider Fig. 9. Suppose
that a non-participating SC player (customer or researcher) wants to trace back
the product journey. Firstly, key identifiers are fetched i.e., TID=SM-G8846,
ProductID=R39H50JCOA, and ChannelID=R_ID: SK_SEL679 from the Re-
tailer channel. Secondly, fetched data and auxiliary data are aggregated and col-
lected in PData. Thirdly, based on the 〈SrcID〉=SK_SEL002 and Prev_TID=SM-
G4993, the provenance information (for instance, PackID= SKGIHP001), is then
fetched from next Warehouse channel such that Prev_TID equals TID. Simi-
larly, following Prev_TID=SM-S7850 and 〈SrcID〉=M_ID: SK_PYE001 the
information related to batch BID, model# and make is obtained from Manu-
facturing Unit channel. Here we can see that the batches holding components
may arrive from different suppliers located in different countries. Hence, based
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TID: SM-G8846
Serial#: R39H50JCOA
<SrcID>: SK_SEL002
Prev_TID: SM-G4993
IMEI#: 4565000752338891
Model#: SM-G930S
Manufacturing Unit
M_ID: SK_PYE001
Payload
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BID: SKPYEL01D
<SrcID>: NULL
Retailer
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SData
TID: 7000
BID: CNSHEL01A
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Model#: A142B
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TID: SM-S7850
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<SrcID>: SK_GIH003
TData
AData
TID: SM-G4993
<SrcID>: SK_PYE001
Prev_TID: SM-S7850
Warehouse
W_ID: SK_SEL002
Payload
TData
AData
PackID: SKGIHP001
SData
Retailer
R_ID: SK_SEL679
Payload
TData
AData
Supplier
S_ID: SK_GIH003
Payload
TData
AData
Supplier
S_ID: CN_SHE005 
Payload
TData
AData
TID: SM-S7851
BID: CNSHEL01A
<SrcID>: CN_SHE005
Transfer of material/product among SC players
Sub-information held by TData and AData
Association between respective TID and CID
Fig. 9: Product ledger showing Provenance Data throughout the product journey in
the electronics supply chain.
on TID=SM-S7850, BID=SKPYEL01D and CID=SKPYE100A information are
obtained. Also 〈SrcID〉=S_ID: SK_GIH003 is used to reach the respective Sup-
plier channel. Since 〈SrcID〉=NULL, therefore no further channelID is required
to fetch more information. It is important to note that the additional information
can be fetched and aggregated from TData and AData based on the user’s query.
It is important to note that the query results also depends on access privileges
defined by the SC players.
6 Simulation
We simulate the proposed provenance-based scheme for SC by using the current
implementation of MAM protocol on a system having an Intel i5-3330 CPU @
When IOTA ECOSYSTEM Meets The Electronics Supply Chain Space 17
Algorithm 3 Fetching and Aggregating Provenance Data from the Tangle
1: procedure fetch_aggr(PData)
2: do
3: for each subscribed channel Ci do
4: Mam.fetchSingle (root, restricted, K) . Fetch a single transaction from
the subscribed channel.
5: payload= TData||AData . Extract and decipher the payload.
6: if (Ci == Retailer) then
7: Pfetch ← TID || ProductID || ChannelID . Fetch data from TData.
8: Paggr ← Pfetch || AData . Aggregate other granular details.
9: PData ← Paggr
10: goto 〈SrcID〉 channel . Go to the intermediate source channel.
11: look for Prev_TID == TID . Look up for the transaction ID.
12: else
13: Pfetch ← TID || ChannelID . Fetch data from TData.
14: Paggr ← Pfetch || AData . Aggregate other granular details.
15: PData ← Paggr
16: goto 〈SrcID〉 channel . Go to the intermediate source channel.
17: look for Prev_TID == TID . Look up for the transaction ID.
18: end if
19: end for
20: while 〈SrcID〉 6= NULL
21: end procedure
3.00GHz. In our simulation, we ignore the negligible time required to change
the MAM mode and convert the message from bytes to trytes. We focused our
analysis on the steps of attaching and fetching a message that has significant
time delays. We compute the average time (ms) required to attach and fetch
payload from the Tangle using MAM protocol. The results in Table 2 show that
the average time to attach and fetch data has no correlation to payload size.
Fig. 10 represents the distribution of data based on minimum, first quartile,
median, third quartile, maximum, and outliers for 15 trials with payload size
ranging from 100 to 900 characters. It is important to note that the Attach
phase: corresponds to attaching payload (consisting of TData and AData) while
the Fetch phase: corresponds to fetch and construct PData from the fetched
payload. Depending on the query criteria and access privileges defined on the
basis of channel splitting, PData can be constructed. For simplicity, we consider
that the query acquires every possible detail (i.e., entire payload) during the
fetch phase to derive provenance information.
7 Discussion: Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security claims and their justification to evaluate
the performance of our proposed provenance-based scheme for SC.
Claim 1: Data Confidentiality.
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Fig. 10: Latency for (a) attaching payload data to Tangle and (b) fetching payload
from Tangle.
Table 2: MAM experiment results showing Attach and Fetch Payload.
Payload size
(char)
Action Average
time (ms)
Standard
Deviation
Variance
100 Attach 9008.8 4841.11 23436300.17
300 Attach 9120.27 5235.01 27405355.50
500 Attach 9024.47 5190.05 26936646.84
700 Attach 9140.93 5067.75 25682040.21
900 Attach 8930.6 5277.37 27850598.98
100 Fetch 40540.53 8199.26 67227862.27
300 Fetch 3909.2 7955.17 63284747.74
500 Fetch 3731.6 7608.90 57895312.26
700 Fetch 3820.13 7434.15 55266627.55
900 Fetch 3946.4 7905.96 62504253.4
Justification: To conceal classified trade information among competitors, it
is essential to encrypt data communication.
Claim 2: Channel Splitting.
Justification: MAM channel enables off-shooting channel particularly when
the entirety of data is not intended to be shared. Such fine-grained access to data
are desired in many scenarios in SC. For example, the retailer may share the
sales data or customer buying pattern data with the marketing companies while
preserving the customer personally identifiable information (PII). Similarly, the
idea of channel splitting can also be used to limit access to a company’s trade
secrets from joint ventures, suppliers, distributors or customers. Another signif-
icant use case example scenario is when one of the companies is buying some of
its product’s components from its competitor company.
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To illustrate the process of fine-grained access through channel splitting, let’s
consider a scenario. Suppose, a seller S1 (SID: SK_GIH003) is selling compo-
nents (for instance, DRAM chips) to a buyer B3. S1 also outsource its compo-
nents to one of its partner sub-seller Ssub (SID: CN_SHE005) who further sell
components to other buyers B1 and B2. S1 and Ssub define access control rights
for their buyers so that they are able to retrieve required information from them.
The information, in particular, can be generalized as TData, AData, Salesinfo
(showing sales pattern), Clientinfo (list of clients), Manufacturinginfo (manu-
facturing process), Advertisinginfo (advertising strategies). The defined policies
and few example queries are discussed in Table 3. The query results can be
retrieved on the basis of provenance key elements i.e., TID, ProductID, and
ChannelID.
Table 3: Channel Splitting Example Scenario: Fine-grained Access Rights.
Channel ID Policies Queries Result
SID:
SK_GIH003
Allow B3 to access: TData, AData Fetch Salesinfo from S1 Access Denied
Allow Ssub to access: TData, AData,
Salesinfo, Clientinfo, Advertisinginfo
Retrieving Manufacturinginfo
from S1
Access Denied
Fetch Salesinfo from S1 Access Granted
SID:
CN_SHE005
Allow B1 to access TData, AData,
Clientinfo
Fetch Clientinfo from Ssub Access Granted
Allow B2 to access TData, AData,
Salesinfo
Fetch Clientinfo from Ssub Access Denied
Claim 3: Access Rights.
Justification: Keeping in view the rivalry among electronics competitors, it is
essential to share data with only legit entities. Thus, the data can only be access
by authorized parties.
8 Related Work
8.1 Legacy systems: Enterprise Software Solutions for SC
Despite of massive investment by world’s leading companies in deploying digi-
tal infrastructure to run computerized on-premise enterprise resource planning
(ERP) and supply chain management software (SCMS) that enables the elec-
tronic tracking of products from their origins to the recycling bin, yet most of
the companies are still squandering and frittering money and resources because
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Table 4: Evolution in SC: From Spreadsheets to DLT
Technology Used Examples Shortcomings
Legacy Systems: Spreadsheets,
ERP Software
Microsoft Excel, SAP ERP, Busi-
ness Planning and Control System,
Microsoft Dynamics i) on-premises software,
ii) cost incurred on software
implementation, maintenance,
and customization,
iii) rigid hierarchical organization,
iv) interoperability or migration of
existing data,
v) data as transaction manage-
ment,
vi) lack of dynamic forecasting due
to siloed information across en-
terprise wreaks havoc,
vii) inflexibility and vendor depen-
dency,
viii) no support for real-time track-
ing of business-critical pro-
cesses through IoT devices
ix) lag behind security, access con-
trol, and auditability.
Cloud-based solutions Oracle Enterprise Resource Plan-
ning Cloud, Sage Business Cloud
Enterprise Management i) organization-specific i.e., un-
able to allow extensive cus-
tomization and complex inte-
gration with third-party ser-
vices and systems,
ii) performance risks i.e. speed
and reliability of the network,
outage risks and limitations on
data transfer,
iii) requires more secure access
control mechanisms to scotch
data breaching and storing
tamper-proof data.
BC-based solutions Blockchain frameworks: IBM BC
framework [28], Hyperledger [29],
skuchain [30], Provenance [31],
Blockverify [32], Multichain [33]
i) scalability,
ii) off-line accessibility,
iii) proprietary,
iv) lack of implementation details.
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of the inter and intra organizational analog gaps [34]. In addition to informa-
tion discontinuity and desynchronization as a weak link, handling transactions
are complex and rampant because each participant has his own ledger that may
increase the possibility of human error or fraud whereas reliance on a middle-
man for validation leads to inefficiencies. Other factors include high cost of ERP
software incurred during implementation, maintenance or upgrading as well as
time-consuming customization process.
8.2 Cloud-based solution for SC
To bridge the fragmented siloed information across global partners, cloud com-
puting solution (for instance, Software as a Service SaaS) are plugged into SC.
Cloud-based solutions solve utmost issues in the legacy systems including agility,
accessibility of complete and connected real-time provenance information. How-
ever, cloud computing in SC still facing stumbling block peculiarly storing the
data or sensor values in a secure and confidential manner is still under question,
for example, according to a report8 concerning the adoption of supply chain
management solutions in the cloud by Oracle, security remains a top concern.
Cloud-based services are organization-specific and during product trading, pro-
vision to record the data on the cloud becomes solely the choice of the current
product owner.
8.3 DLT-based Solution for Supply Chain
DLT, for instance, BC is a nascent technology that has the potential to solve im-
portant glitches in traceability and provenance challenges. BC technology allows
companies to record every event within a supply chain on a distributed ledger
that is shared among all participants and not owned by any and record events
in a secure, immutable and irrevocable ways.
Recently, various worldwide enterprises have played a significant role in pro-
viding BC-based platforms for supporting friction-less traceability and trans-
parency in SCs, for instance, IBM’s blockchain framework [28] has been adopted
by Walmart, Nestle, Unilever and others in the global FSC9. Other BC-enabled
supply chain frameworks are provided by Hyperledger [29], skuchain [30], Prove-
nance [31], Blockverify [32], and Multichain [33], however, these proprietary and
private BC solutions are unable to address the specific requirements or needs in
the public domain.
8.3.1 Application Perspective: BC solution-approach in SC BC-based
architecture for SC has been used in agriculture or food products [9–12], avi-
ation industry, [13], and many other uses cases discussed in [14]. However, the
overall shortcomings associated with these approaches include portraying BC as
8"The future for cloud-based supply chain management solutions"
9August 2019, "IBM Blockchain to help prevent contamination in the global food
supply chain".
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a black box (i.e., lack of implementation details), scalability, accessibility, and
auditability based on roles and access levels.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we target two key challenging issues (i) disparate data reposito-
ries and (ii) untrustworthy data disseminating in the electronics supply chain
space. To address these obstacles, we employ IOTA permissioned ledger that
use MAM protocol as an application layer to allow distributed and trustworthy
data accessible to only authorized SC players. By exploiting the MAM channel,
the data publishers share their data securely while allowing the data receivers to
access, analyze, and validate its ownership. Therefore, it is feasible to construct
the product provenance story through trustworthy sources and immutable data
streams flowing across the global supply chain. In addition to tracking exchanged
transaction information, we also discuss the solution to integrate sensor data to
circulate the consignment location information.
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